Fiscal policy and fickle fortunes: what’s luck got to do with it? by David Altig
Among the more amazing elements of
the amazing U.S. economic landscape of
the latter 1990s was the transition from
federal budget deficits as far back as
memory can recall to budget surpluses as
far forward as the eye can see. This de-
velopment was as sudden and unexpected
as it was welcome, and virtually over-
night the political debate shifted from
how to restrain government spending and
enhance government revenues to how
best to allocate the spoils of the seem-
ingly successful federal budget battles. 
Not everyone, however, is convinced that
the war is over. In his testimony to Con-
gress on February 17, 2000, Federal Re-
serve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan
commented that “it might … be prudent
to eschew new longer-term, potentially
irreversible commitments until we are
assured that the on-budget surplus pro-
jections are less conjectural than they are,
of necessity, today.”
This comment reflects a concern,
shared by many, that there is an unques-
tioned presumption that projected sur-
pluses are as good as achieved, and that
such a presumption is a shaky founda-
tion from which to launch major new
budget initiatives.
In this Economic Commentary, I briefly
review the fiscal fortunes of the 1990s
and attempt to answer the question
posed in this article’s title. What’s luck
got to do with it? An awful lot, I con-
tend, and with that conclusion comes a
strong cautionary tale about counting
our future fiscal surpluses before they
hatch.
        Birds of a Feather
In November 1990, President Bush
signed into law the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA90).
This legislation provided for deficit
reductions of $482 billion over the five-
year period 1991–95, to be accom-
plished with a combination of tax hikes,
restraints on mandatory spending pro-
grams, and caps on discretionary expen-
ditures. Over that five-year period,
actual deficits rose $6 billion relative to
the cumulative levels projected prior to
the bill’s passage.
In August 1993, President Clinton signed
into law the Omnibus Budget Reconcil-
iation Act of 1993 (OBRA93). This leg-
islation provided for deficit reductions of
$433 billion over the five-year period
1994–98, to be accomplished with a
combination of tax hikes, restraints on
mandatory spending programs, and caps
on discretionary expenditures. Over that
five-year period, cumulative deficits fell
more than $1 trillion relative to the
cumulative levels projected prior to the
bill’s passage.
As OBRA93 began to take form, the
general perception was that OBRA90
had been tried and had failed. In the sum-
mer of 1993, before OBRA93 was
passed, the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) foresaw deficits rising to $360
billion by 1998. By fiscal year 1998,
however, the federal budget was $69 bil-
lion in the black, making a strong argu-
ment for the case that the later legislation
succeeded where the earlier could not. 
But two outcomes so differenct hardly
seem to belong to the same domain and
century, let alone two nearly identical
pieces of legislation spaced a mere three
years apart. Furthermore, the over-
achievement of OBRA93 was as unex-
pected as the underachievement of
OBRA90. Even after the passage of
OBRA93, the CBO was projecting that
the federal budget for fiscal year 1998
would be $200 billion in deficit. 
        Details, Details
The first obvious question is whether the
specifics of OBRA90 and OBRA93
were sufficiently different to explain
why one would succeed and the other
would not. The answer is no.
In terms of the sheer magnitude of their
goals, the two pieces of legislation were
nearly identical. OBRA90 had five-year
deficit-reduction provisions accumulat-
ing to $482 billion, and OBRA93 had
provisions accumulating to $433 billion.
Nor were the broad details of the pack-
ages dissimilar, the primary distinction
being that OBRA90 was more heavily
weighted toward discretionary expendi-
ture cuts and OBRA93 more toward rev-
enue increases. (Discretionary spending
items are subject to annual approval by
Congress.) About 39 percent of the
planned deficit reduction in the 1990
legislation came from nonentitlement
spending cuts, and 33 percent from rev-
enue increases. The corresponding fig-
ures for the 1993 bill were 16 percent
and 55 percent.
April 1, 2000
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
Fiscal Policy and Fickle Fortunes:
What’s Luck Got to Do With It?
by David Altig
ISSN 0428-1276
If you buy a lottery ticket, you usually
wait to see if you’ve won before going
on a spending spree. This Economic
Commentary explains why we ought to
be just as careful about spending pro-
jected federal budget surpluses.Important to both of these pieces of legis-
lation were institutional procedures to re-
strain federal expenditure and tax policy
changes. These procedures were intro-
duced in the 1990 Budget Enforcement
Act (BEA), the companion legislation to
OBRA90. The potential for OBRA90
and OBRA93 to achieve their deficit
goals clearly depended on subsequent
Congresses adhering to the provisions of
the BEA. So, did OBRA93 succeed
where OBRA90 failed because Congress
and the Administration became more dis-
ciplined and more faithfully hewed to the
BEA’s procedural limitations? Again, the
answer is no. Afair reading of the record
clearly shows that the failure of OBRA90
to meet its stated deficit reduction goals
did not occur because Congress and the
Administration significantly reneged on
their legislative promises.
   It’s the Economy, Stupid?
One very plausible explanation for the
dramatically different records of the two
budget packages lies in the fact that the
post–OBRA93 economic landscape was
much different than that of the short
post–OBRA90 era. For most of the
period after the 1990 legislation, the
American economy has been in the
upswing phase of the business cycle. But
the record-breaking episode of economic
growth that commenced in April 1991
seems like a tale of two expansions:
Uncharacteristically sluggish at its
inception, astonishingly robust well past
the prime of most other business cycles.
While higher-than-average economic
growth has been the hallmark of the
early phases of most postwar U.S.
expansions, economic performance in
the first years of this expansion was sur-
prisingly soft. In the first three years of
the four previous sustained expansions,
the growth rate of real gross domestic
product (GDP) averaged nearly 17 per-
cent.1 This represents yearly growth
rates of about 5.1 percent, well above 
the postwar (1958–99) average of about
3.4 percent. In contrast, during the three
years following the 1990–91 recession—
roughly the period from the implementa-
tion of OBRA90 through the passage of
OBRA93—GDPgrew only 10 percent,
just less than the annual postwar average. 
This performance, along with other coin-
cident macroeconomic developments—
such as the paths of interest rates and
inflation—took its toll on the federal
budget. Over the three years from 1991
through 1993, economic projection errors
accounted for actual federal deficits that
were some $66 billion in excess of initial
budget resolution estimates. Initial bud-
get resolutions are the annual “first
drafts” of the federal budget prepared by
Congress to guide spending and taxation
for the subsequent fiscal year. Thus, this
$66 billion miscalculation derives from
projections made at the beginning of
each fiscal year, not from five-year esti-
mates. Although one might expect impre-
cision in longer-term prognostications,
the substantial differences between bud-
get resolution projections and actual out-
comes drive home the enormous difficul-
ties inherent in budget forecasting, even
at horizons as short as one year.
The economy over the course of the cur-
rent expansion has, of course, steadily
improved. Annual GDPgrowth averaged
about 3.4 percent per year during 1994–
96 and about 4.2 percent in 1997–99. The
sustained acceleration of growth so long
into this cycle was as surprisingly favor-
able to the budget picture as the “delayed
response” of the economy early in the
cycle was unfavorable. In budgetary
terms, economic influences over the
immediate post–OBRA93 period (1994–
96) were the mirror image of the post–
OBRA90 episode. In contrast to the $66
billion dollar increase associated with
economic developments in 1991–93,
over the 1994–96 period macroeconomic
forecast mistakes reduced actual deficits
by $67 billion relative to initial budget
resolution projections.
And the hits just kept coming. In 1997
and 1998, the economy contributed 
$108 billion more than expected toward
higher revenues and lower outlays,
enough in 1998 to help shove the federal
budget from the red-ink territory origi-
nally anticipated to the first surplus in al-
most 30 years. Over the entire 1997–99
period, the U.S. economy contributed
$203 billion more to the government’s
coffers than the CBO had  expected in
January 1997. 
But what caused this striking economic
turnaround? It is implausible that policy
differences explain the differential eco-
nomic performance in the episodes
immediately following OBRA90 and
OBRA93. Amore convincing case
might be made that the economy needed
the double barrels of OBRA90 and
OBRA93 to slay the deficit beast and
unleash the potential that was finally
realized in the latter half of the 1990s.
Possibly, but few are the informed
observers who would make such dramatic
claims for fiscal legislation in isolation.
Writing in a recent issue of the Wall Street
Journal, economist (and former Federal
Reserve Governor) Lawrence Lindsey
points to a collection of regulatory
reforms, changes in monetary policy, tax
reform, and financial-market innovation
dating back to 1982 for an explanation of
recent economic prosperity.2  Even these
—very significant—influences may ulti-
mately be viewed as minor when juxta-
posed with the building momentum of
productivity advances unleashed by the
information-technology revolution, de-
velopments that the University of
Rochester’s Jeremy Greenwood dates
back to the mid-1970s.3
But even if we unrealistically attribute all
of the positive economic surprises to the
combined effects of OBRA90 and
OBRA93, we would still fall far short of
an explanation for the dramatic deficit
reductions that we have actually enjoyed.
Consider, again, some numbers. Over the
five years from 1994 through 1998, bud-
get deficits were cumulatively some
$415 billion lower than projected in the
year-by-year budget resolutions. Of this
total, only about 42 percent can be attrib-
uted, after the fact, to imperfect foresight
about macroeconomic developments.
What, then, accounts for the remaining
58 percent in cumulative annual mis-
estimates from 1994 through 1998? The
official answer: “Technical factors.”
   The Measure of Our
Ignorance
The distinction between economic and
technical factors is a rather fine one, in
that technical factors are typically eco-
nomic in nature. In formulating its bud-
get projections, the CBO uses a method-
ology that partially relies on forecasts of
such things as GDP, inflation, and inter-
est rates. Also key are projections about
the components of income. How fast will
wages and salaries grow? Corporate
profits? Based on these projections, the
CBO uses statistical models to estimate
the likely magnitudes of spending and
revenues, and then combines these esti-
mates with projections for other key ele-
ments of the macroeconomic landscape
(like capital-gains realizations) to devel-
op an overall budget outlook.
Over time, and in particular circum-
stances, economic developments willconspire to undermine budget projec-
tions, not just because the broad macro-
economic forecasts of GDP, interest rates,
and inflation are wrong, but also because
the methods used to connect the forecasts
to revenue and spending outcomes fall
short. The behavior of the stock market
and revenues from capital-gains realiza-
tions, for example, are notoriously diffi-
cult to predict, even with perfect knowl-
edge of GDPgrowth, interest rates, and
inflation. Although capital-gains realiza-
tions clearly represent an economic deci-
sion by equity owners, forecast errors
from this source are classified as “techni-
cal,” rather than “economic,” in the
framework of the CBO’s official reports.
How problematic is the observation that
technical factors account for a good
chunk of unexpected surprises over the
past decade? Very. Technical explana-
tions of discrepancies between the bud-
get outlook and actual outcomes are by
nature made after the fact. Otherwise,
they would be part of the outlook in the
first place. This fact suggests the near-
inevitability that the complicated interac-
tions critical to budget forecasts will
remain a blight on the best-laid plans.
This inevitability is readily acknowl-
edged by budget analysts.
And some discrepancies there can be.
Figure 1 illustrates the sources of differ-
ences between estimates based on initial
budget resolutions and the actual deficit
outcomes for 1980–98. The most strik-
ing element of this figure is the very
large and persistent role played by tech-
nical factors in the history of budget-
resolution/actual-budget discrepancies
since 1993. In fact, although subsequent
revisions were not always as dramatic 
as that year’s, it is now clear that 1993
was just an early entry in an unbroken
string of technical developments that
have substantially altered the federal
budgetary landscape. Over the entire
period from OBRA90’s birth through
fiscal year 1998, technical misses were
over one and a half times as large, in
absolute value, as the misses attributable
to simple macroeconomic outcomes.
     The Roseanne 
Roseannadanna Factor
The sources of this string of technical
misses are found in familiar budgetary
issues, both chronic and acute. In 1991
and 1992, lower-than-expected expendi-
tures associated with the cost of the sav-
ings and loan crisis were helping to dis-
guise misses in Medicare and Medicaid
spending and capital-gains-tax collec-
tions that were expanding the size of the
federal deficit. Unlike the thrift-related
developments, many of which might
reasonably have been associated with
the policy-change category, these items
were more truly technical in nature, aris-
ing from incomplete information and our
imperfect ability to estimate their bud-
getary impact.4
What changed after OBRA93 was that
the mistakes in guessing future federal
revenue receipts and Medicare/Medicaid
outlays were happy ones, made happier,
perhaps, by being so unexpected. As an
illustrative case, consider the history of
post–OBRA93 technical revisions to the
fiscal year 1998 (FY98) budget.5  In
September 1993, the CBO released its
first regular budget outlook report subse-
quent to the passage of OBRA93, pro-
jecting a deficit of $200 billion for
FY98. As noted earlier, the FY98 federal
budget actually registered a surplus of
$69 billion. One-half of that turnaround
resulted from technical revisions to rev-
enue estimates and Medicare/Medicaid
expenditure projections.
One of the more striking aspects of this
history is how late in the game it became
apparent that revenues would be much
higher, and social health insurance out-
lays much lower, than had been expected.
More than 90 percent of the total techni-
cal revisions made subsequent to the ini-
tial 1993 projection for the FY98 surplus
came in 1997 and 1998. Nearly half of
that total revision was made in 1998.
And these numbers capture only the
forecast errors that can’t be explained by
unforeseen technical forces. Discrepan-
cies from technical and economic
sources combined account for more than
the $269 billion swing from the FY98
deficit projected in September 1993 to
the surplus that was actually realized.
Almost all of these discrepancies were
unexpected prior to 1997. About 40 per-
cent were unforeseen prior to 1998.
We can, of course, construct reasonable
explanations after the fact. The strong-
growth, low-inflation U.S. economy of
the latter 1990s brought with it a boom-
ing stock market, an acceleration of
capital-gains realizations, and burgeon-
ing revenues from this source. Chang-
ing methods of delivering health care
services, many of which were responses
to earlier policy decisions, no doubt
helped to moderate Medicare and Medic-
aid expenditure growth.
But these are just examples of the “Rose-
anne Roseannadanna factor”: It’s always
something. Ex post rationalization of
extreme miscalculations hardly makes
the case for confident extrapolation.
   Fiscal Policy and 
Fickle Fortunes
The record clearly shows that budget pro-
jections retain their conjectural nature for
a very long time—sometimes nearly to
the point where they pass from projec-
tions into history. Faced with this reality,
prudence requires a lot of patience.
Consider this. In 1995, the Republican
Congress and the Clinton Administration
became embroiled in a dispute over bud-
getary priorities that resulted in two
partial shutdowns of the federal govern-
ment, a dispute with political ramifica-
tions that still persist today. Among the
major items of contention was the Con-
gressional intention to cut outlays on
Medicare and Medicaid by $452 billion
over the period from 1996 through 2002.
As of the latest CBO projections, cumu-
lative changes in actual and projected
outlays in this category have yielded 55

















1981 1980 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
FIGURE 1   SOURCES OFDIFFERENCES BETWEEN ACTUALBUDGET
TOTALS AND BUDGET RESOLUTION ESTIMATES
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.adjustments alone—those that are not
directly related to macroeconomic devel-
opments or the projected impact of pol-
icy changes.
In this case, it was definitely better to be
lucky than good. But luck has a history
—and a recent one, at that—of turning
south. That is a lesson worth remember-
ing as we contemplate how we might
exploit projected federal surpluses as far
as the eye can see. 
     Footnotes
1.  The real GDP growth rates for each of
these episodes was 17.5 percent (1961:IIQ–
1964:IIQ), 12.4 percent (1971:IQ–1974:IQ),
17.8 percent (1975:IIQ–1978:IIQ), and 17.8
percent (1983:IQ–1986:IQ). These, and other
GDP figures reported in the text reflect recent
revisions in the U.S. national income and
product accounts.
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(1999, Quarter 2).
4.  In both 1992 and 1993, anticipated Con-
gressional funding of the Resolution Trust
Corporation—the organization created to im-
plement the thrift-industry reorganization—
failed to materialize, and in the end total out-
lays associated with financial sector distress
fell significantly short of initial guesses. The
big S&L-related budget-projection errors in
these years are attributed to technical rather
than policy sources only because the CBO
classified them as such.
5.  The figures in this section are taken from
various issues of the CBO’s beginning-of-year
publication, The Economic and Budget Out-
look, and its midyear updates. The revisions
reported across these publications may not
sum to the actual cumulative change in budget
estimates between any two publication dates
due to interim changes in the baseline.
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